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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STAI'E OF UTAH 
L'NlON PACIFIC RAILROAD 1· 
l'OMPANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ) 
STA .. TE TAX COMMISSION OF 
lT'fAH ' Defendant. 
No. 
10710 
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF IN REPLY TO 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF 
THE CASE 
This is a petition for rehearing of the court's 
determination that fuel oil used in the propulsion of 
plaintiff's locomotives was a commercial use subject 
to tlie Utah sales tax under provisions of Utah Code 
Ann. S 5H- l 5-4 ( 1963) . 
1 
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
On March 13, 1967, this court rendered its opinon · 
...;y;~n by A. H. Ellett, Justice, and concurred in 11! · 
,,---~embers of the court, sustaining the Utah Stali 
Tax Commission, and held that the railroads were sur, 
j ect to the Utah sales tax on fuel oil used to prope' 
its engines upon its railways. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON PETITION FOR 
REHEARING 
It is the defendant's position that the decisior 
entered by this court on March 13, 1967, properly ap 
plied the law and fully considered all of the matte~ 
raised by the plaintiff in its petition, and that the pel1 
tion for rehearing should be denied. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The relevant facts have been set forth previou)i!. 
and need not be recited herein. 
ARGUMENT AND BRIEF IN REPLY TO 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
THE P E TI T I 0 N SETS FORTH Ni 
GR 0 UN D S WHICH WOULD JUSTifl 
2 
1,11,\ :\T1NG THE PETITION FOR REHEAH-
ING UNDER UTAH LAW. 
w. It is the rule of this court that a strong case must 
J,, be made to justify petition for rehearing. Brown v. 
iii Pickard, 4 Utah 292, 11 Pac. 512 ( 1886). A petition 
11 for rehearing should be denied unless the court has 
it f:tllcrl to consider a material point, has erred as a matter 
,,f la 11 in its conclusion, or has been unable to consider 
,1JI1w material matter which has been newly discovered. 
f 11 re .Tames McKnight, 4 Utah 237, 9 Pac. 299 ( 1886) ; 
i'11111111i11,r;i; v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 Pac. 619 
(1910). 
ff Where the court has fully considered all of the 
1v material matters of the case in its original opinion; 
:~ 11here it has considered all of the matters asked to be 
t rrriPwed; where the petition for rehearing sets forth 
~ j ~ 
no matters not previously considered; and, where the law 
has Leen properly applied, a petition for rehearing 
1lionld be denied. Venard v. Green, 4 Utah 67, 6 Pac. 
m ( 1885); Panagopulous V. Manning, 93 Utah 215, 
i~ P. 2d 456 ( 1937) ; Edwards v. Clark, 96 Utah 140, 
85 P.2d 768 (1938). See also: 5 C.J.S. Appeal and 
Error§ 1411, et seq.; Louisell and Degnan, Rehearing 
il1 American Appellate Courts, 25 F.R.D. 143 (1960). 
. The plaintiff devotes a considerable portion of its 
hrief to an analysis of the term "commercial" and its 
tn11tention that the term is uncertain and ambiguous. 
liii, comt was fully cognizant of the argument that 
'\ !Le term "commercial" was broad enough to include 
3 
~11 phases of business activity, and that the Legislatu, 
m enacting the statute must have intended a somewlio 
narrower construction. It was the opinion of this cour, 
that the Legislature intended to carve out of this broa1. 
category of business activity an area which could I: 
properly defined as industrial. This court has herel1· 
fore recognized this const;ruction. Umon Portlaiw 
Cement Co. v. State Tax Comm'n., 110 Utah 152, 111: 
P.2d 879 (1947). 
Being a ware of this, this court then concluded tlia· 
as so used in the statute, the term was not ambiguou· 
or uncertain, and that it need only determine whetht; 
the use of fuel oil in the propulsion of railroad locn 
motives was a commercial consumption. 
It then held, not as plaintiff contends in its briei 
that an industrial use is only that of fabricating mer 
chandise subject to sales tax when completed; but, tha: 
if fuel oil is used to fabricate such merchandise, i· 
would be an industrial use and that if fuel oil is us~. 
in the propulsion of locomotives, such as in the p]alli· 
tiff's case, it would be a commercial use. 
Prior to the hearing of this case on oral argumen! 
the plaintiff had contended that there was a twiligf 
area between commercial use and industrial use, an: 
that it fit within that category-whatever it may~ 
This position was abandoned on oral argument. ou 
now it seems that the plaintiff is attempting to retun 
to it. It seems to argue that it is not a commercinl entei 
prise within the meaning of the statute without cot 
4 
derlllg whether it fits within the category of indus-
tnal a~ the area not intended to be taxed as heretofore 
rnnstrue<l by this court. 
In reply to the defendant's presentation on oral 
argument, the plaintiff's opening remarks were (re-
fmmg to counsel for defendant) : 
Much of his argument seems to be involved 
in attempting to limit the nature of the areas 
that are involved to industrial and commercial. 
l n other words, there are two categories. We 
think that is right. There doesn't need to be 
any dispute about that. We've got to qualify 
on the industrial side of the ledger or we are 
in the commercial. Then we are through with 
our case and we are taxable. So there is no need 
to dispute that point. 
This court was fully aware of the argument plain-
tiff is now making; heard it abandoned by him; and, 
etl presumably, gave that argument due consideration in 
arriving at its decision. This court and other courts 
u1· 
have long considered that commercial use must be con-
sidered as opposed to industrial use in determining 
nt taxability. Union Portland Cement Co. v. State Taa; 
f Comm'n, supra; Ogden Union Railway & Depot Co. 
n: '"State Ta,v Comm'n, 16 Utah 2d 255, 399 P.2d 145 
~ 119fl5) (on rehearing); St. Louis Refri,geration & Cold 
1u Storage Co. v. United States, 43 F. Supp. 476, (Ct. 
1n \1. l!l42); Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v. Iowa State Tax 
er l'onun'u, ____ Iowa ---·• 142 N.W. 2d 407 (1966); and, 
JL iirially, rVisconsin Electric Power Co. v. United States, 
5 
I 
336 U.S. 176, 69 Sup. Ct. 492, 93 L.Ed. 597 (194fJ 
1 
in which the court said: ! 
Although the language of the section does no1 
include the word "industrial," it is clear from /!
1 
legislative history that "commercial" was useu 
in contradistinction to "industrial." ·While elec-
tricity sold for commercial consumption is taxeo. 
that sold for industrial consumption is not. Thu, 
our task resolves itself to a determination 011 
the category in which the consumption of elet 
tricity by these dairy plants should be clas)1· 
fied. 'Ve shall not undertake the difficult an~ 
here needless task of general definition whid 
differentiates for this statutory clause between. 
industrial and commercial in other lines of bus1 I 
ness activity .... (Emphasis added). ! 
The only case to the contrary seems to be Stater 
Smith, 342 Mo. 75, 111 S.W. 2d 513 (1938), and itti 
of questionable applicability here since it was decideo 
prior to the enactment of the Utah statute; prior fo 
the Supreme Court decision in TVisconsin; and, prior 
to the subsequent Utah, Court of Claims and Iowacas~ 
cited above. 
I 
! 
It would appear that this court properly considerec 
only the terms of the statute itself since the terms 11tr' 
thought to be unambiguous and refused to considt' 
statements made by individual members of vario~ 
bodies. After analyzing the terms of the statute, it wa· 
then only necessary to determine whether the use. 0 I 1 
the fuel oil by the plaintiff was industrial or commerrw 1 • 
I 
6 
11HI we feel it was quite properly concluded that the 
,iJes were subject to the tax imposed by the statute. 
The plaintiff devotes too many pages in this peti-
1 t1on for rehearing in trying to show the nuances of the 
terms "commerce" and "commercial" and then con-
rludes that this court should use the term "commercial 
111 its strict sense and 'industrial' in its broad sense." 
h 
11 \ 1.Pd. for Reh., p. IO). 
There is nothing in the statute or in the rules of 
I· 
11, statutory construction which would require this, nor 
:l is there anything in this opinion or previous opinions 
:: I •ii this co~rt ,~o i~,~icate t~a~' i~ has used either the term 
I commercial or mdustrial m too narrow or too broad 
i a 1ense. The court has simply concluded here that for 
the purpose of the statute certain activities should be 
b considered commercial and certain activities should be 
el considered industrial, and that the operation of a rail-
road upon its system of railways, transporting persons 
or and freight and goods for hire and using fuel oil to 
ib perform these functions, is a commercial use just as 
ll'ould be the moving of people and freight across a 
metropolitan area by taxi, bus or trolley. 
e; 
:i· Again, that services such as transportation are 
r:onsidered to be commercial for the purpose of the It: 
applicable statute involved was determined in Ogden 
I~ 
13
, ['nion Railway & Depot Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 
,. l6l'tah ~d 255, 399 P.2d 145 (1965) (on rehearing), 
.
1 
I 11hich C'ase this court quoted favorably on pages 3 and 
I" I 
' : 
111f the Green Sheet opinion. 
7 
I 
Finally, while this is not conclusive as to u11 ! 
nature of the plaintiff's business for the purpo,t I 
of this statute, it is worth noting that most of t]1, I 
plaintiff's activities are regulated by the federal gor i 
ernment through the Interstate Commerce Commi1 I 
sion. The very nomenclature suggests that the plain i 
tiff's activities should be considered commercial ratl1e; I 
than industrial. I 
Since the legislature has created the classificatirn1 I 
which causes thi.s plaintiff to be taxed on its use of fuel I 
oil, it is to the legislature that the plaintiff must seeK I 
its relief. 
CONCLUSION 
It is contended, therefore, that the plaintiff Jia; 
presented nothing which would cause the court to gran: 
a rehearing, and it is urged that the petition for re 
hearing be denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
HENRY L. ADAMS 
Assistant Attorney Genernl 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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